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According to reasons fundamentalism, all normative properties are analyzable in terms of rea-
sons.1 Famously, some of the analyses offered by reasons fundamentalists face the wrong kind
of reasons problem. This problem first appeared in the literature on the buck-passing account
of value, which says in its simplest form that what it is for something to be valuable is for there
to be sufficient reasons to have a pro-attitude toward it.2 This simple view fails, many worry,
because there can be reasons for having pro-attitudes towards things that have nothing to do
with their value. Contrasting cases like Beauty and Extra Credit provide an illustration:
Beauty: Jane is a first-year graduate student in Art History. She has loved art all her
life, but is just now getting the opportunity to see Europe’s masterpieces through her
graduate program. She sees theMonaLisa in person for the first time. She is enthralled
by its symmetry, depth, and enigmatic tone.
Extra Credit: Jack is a smart aleck on a high school trip to Paris. He couldn’t care less
about art and finds the Louvre to be a total bore. Predictably, he has been causing all
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sorts of trouble. As they enter the roomwith theMonaLisa, Jack starts photobombing
tourists’ shots of the painting. In a fit of frustration, Jack’s high school history teacher
says to him, “Will you just be enthralled by something? I will give you extra credit if
you show some appreciation and respect for the Mona Lisa.”
Jane responds to some reasons to be enthralled by the Mona Lisa. Intuitively, her reasons are
of the right kind. The painting’s depth, symmetry, and enigmatic tone are part of what make
it valuable. Since Jane’s enthrallment is a response to these reasons, it is plausibly fitting. Jack’s
reasons are different. The fact that Jack will get extra credit if he is enthralled does not help to
explain why theMona Lisa is valuable. Jack’s teacher could have provided a similar reason for
him to be enthralled by something with no value—a saucer of mud, for example. If Jack were
to be enthralled just to get extra credit, it is plausible that his enthrallment would be unfitting.
This is because he is enthralled for the wrong kind of reason.
Buck-passers about value need to understand value solely in terms of the right kind of
reasons, it seems.3 Otherwise it seems their view badly overgeneralizes. A sufficient incentive
to have a pro-attitude would entail that the object of that pro-attitude is valuable. This is a bad
prediction. So buck-passers face pressure to explain the distinction between the right kind of
reasons (RKRs) and the wrong kind of reasons (WKRs).
While the literature on buck-passing is the most familiar context in which the wrong
kind of reasons problem arises, it is easy to see that the same problem arises for other reasons
fundamentalist analyses. To see why, one need only consider how reasons fundamentalists
might go about analyzing other normative properties that can be picked out with words of the
form ‘-ible/-able’ and ‘-worthy’, like the properties of being credible, trustworthy, despicable,
noteworthy, and so on. In each case, it is plausible that there can be sufficient reasons for -ing
an X that don’t bear on X’s -ability. For this reason, it is clear that the wrong kind of reasons
problem is a much more general problem.
Interestingly, this point shows not only that reasons fundamentalists have many WKR
problems, but also thatmany theoristshaveWKRproblems. Formany theorists can and should
find it attractive to analyse some things in terms of reasons. Indeed, as Schroeder (2010) em-
phasizes, it is attractive to think that a reasons-based account has to be the right account of
properties like credibility, despicability, trustworthiness, noteworthiness, and so on, what-
ever one thinks about the broader reasons fundamentalist program. Reflections on this fact
have led some—most notably, Schroeder (2010)—to suggest that fundamentalists are off the
hook. The fact that their account would badly overgeneralize without a principled distinction
between RKRs andWKRs does not undermine their approach, they insist, because theWKR
problem is everybody’s problem, and the challenge for fundamentalists will be answered if the
more general questionhas an answer. And so they conclude that they faceno special challenge,
thanks to the generality of the problem.
3We add “it seems” because some buck-passers (e.g., Skorupski (2011), Parfit (2011)) deny that there are
wrong-kind reasons, and hence appeal to reasons, period, rather than right-kind reasons. But this response
neglects the generality of the phenomenon, as we will see.
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Our main goal in this paper is to argue that this conclusion is mistaken and indeed gets
things backwards. We think that reflection on the alleged generality of the distinction between
right- and wrong-kind reasons suggests that life is harder, not easier, for reasons fundamental-
ists. With this goal in mind, we defend two main claims. The first claim is:
(1) The apparent generality of the WKR problem suggests that the class of right-kind
reasons is wider than the class of normative reasons; the reasons that determine “fit-
tingness” are not essentially normative in any sense stronger than that associated with
any arbitrary standard of correctness. This gives rise to what we call the Right-Kind of
Reasons Problem.
The second claim is:
(2) If (1) is true, then some special problems—including a potentially fatal dilemma—
arise for fundamentalists.
After defending (2), we will evaluate several possible escape routes for fundamentalists.
Our plan is as follows. In §2, we begin by considering the case for the generality of the
WKR problem at greater length. We argue that any adequate solution to the more general
WKR problem will imply that not all RKRs are normative reasons. Thus, we cannot deter-
mine which considerations properly figure into reasons-based analyses simply by solving the
WKR problem. We also need to figure out which RKRs are normative reasons, and why they
are normative reasons. This is the Right-Kind of Reasons Problem. To solve the RKR prob-
lem, one needs to solve two other problems, which we call the Normativity Problem and the
Rationale Problem. In §3, we argue that reflection on these problems raises a dilemma, which
we call the Fundamentalist’s Dilemma. In §4, we canvass three responses to this dilemma. The
first two are reductive naturalist views—the first, a Humean view, and the second, a novel
constitutivist view. The third is a new form of quietism, one which enjoys some advantages
over other quietist views. We suggest that the constitutivist option is the best. We leave it to
future work to decide whether this is a strike against reasons fundamentalism or an argument





If the WKR problem is everybody’s problem, there must be a distinction between RKRs and
WKRs that all theorists can and should acknowledge. Thankfully for reasons fundamentalists,
there is a plausible candidate for such a distinction, and it is a very general distinction. As
3 of 27
Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental
Schroeder (2010)points out, wherever onefinds a standard of correctness governing an activity,
one finds a distinction among considerations recommending potential moves in the activity
that could naturally be dubbed a distinction between reasons of the right kind and reasons of
thewrong kind.4 In particular, for any standardof correctness, there are certain considerations
that bear on whether an act would help one to conform to the standard and others that are
simply irrelevant. Insofar, then, as one is engaged in an activity governed by a standard of
correctness, there are certain considerations to which one ought to be sensitive relative to the
standard, and others to which one oughtn’t be sensitive relative to the standard.
It is natural enough to describe this distinction as a distinction between reasons of the
right kind and reasons of the wrong kind. To appreciate this fact, one need only consider
examples like the following pairs of cases:
Rope Pair
GoodBoyScout: Kenny is a precocious and studious boy scout. Hehas learned
how to tie most of the knots in the Boy Scout handbook. He is currently trying
to tie a half-hitch. Placing the left portion of the rope over the right would be
an efficient step toward producing a half-hitch as described by the book. Kenny
chooses to manipulate the rope accordingly with this fact in mind.
Bad Boy Scout: Billy is a terrible boy scout. He has it out for Kenny, and likes
tomess with Kenny’s sense of Boy Scout decency. So when he sees Kenny prac-
ticing his knot tying skills, he decides to have some fun with him. He decides
to offer him $20 to deviate from the book when tying his half-hitch. Kenny sees
the utility of the $20 and is thus disturbed, just as Billy intended. Kenny gives
in this one time and moves the rope in a way that will at best lead to a very bad
example of a half-hitch.
Table Pair
Proper Butler: Mr. Carson is a proper English butler. He always sets the table
to the standards of the proper English tradition. Arranging the forks to the left
of the knives now is oneway to help get the table in order. He chooses to arrange
the silverware accordingly with this fact in mind.
Devious Valet: Thomas is a devious valet. He doesn’t care much for the tradi-
tions exceptwhen he feels they are to his advantage. He decides one day that it is
to his advantage to incentivize breaking tradition for Mr. Carson. So he makes
it so that the only way for Mr. Carson to avoid embarrassment to Lady Mary is
by breaking with table setting tradition and putting the knives to the left of the
forks.
4This point is central to both Schroeder’s (see especially Schroeder (2010)) and D’Arms and Jacobson’s
(see especially D’Arms & Jacobson (2000b)) approaches to the WKR problem.
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In Good Boy Scout, Kenny’s choice is appropriate relative to the standard of correctness es-
tablished by the handbook’s description of a half-hitch (though he hasn’t at the end of the
example yet produced a half-hitch).5 Why? The natural explanation is that Kenny’s choice
properly takes into account howvarious availableways ofmanipulating the ropewouldmake a
difference towhether he correctly produces a half-hitch. Considerations that bear onwhether
a certain way of manipulating the rope would correctly produce a half-hitch are reasons of the
right kind relative to the standard. Hence, Kenny’s choice is appropriate relative to the stan-
dard because it is sensitive to reasons of the right kind relative to the standard. In Bad Boy
Scout, Kenny is not doing what he should be doing by the lights of the standard. He is re-
sponding to an irrelevant consideration relative to the standard, by choosing tomove the rope
in a way that will merely produce somemoney for him.
Similar things can be said about the Table Pair. In Proper Butler, Mr. Carson’s choice
is appropriate by the lights of the relevant standards. A natural explanation is that he chooses
for reasons that are relevant and good relative to the standard: he chooses to move the silver-
ware in a way that will help him to set the whole table in the proper English way. In Devious
Valet, Mr. Carson is led off the proper path by considerations that are irrelevant to the norms
governing such arrangements.
These cases drawattention to adistinction that seemsworth calling adistinctionbetween
reasons of the right kind and reasons of the wrong kind. Notice that this distinction is not just
a distinction amongmotivating or explanatory reasons. Before Kenny decides to place the left
portion over the right, there are variousmoves open to him. In choosingwhichmove tomake,
there are facts to be borne in mind, like:
(RR) The fact that placing the left portion over the right is the most efficient way to
complete the first step towards correctly tying a half-hitch.
To those attempting a half-hitch, RR recommends placing the left portion over the right at
Kenny’s stage. If it were causally possible to skip this step, RR might not conclusively recom-
mend the move. Accordingly, RR’s apparent force may vary depending on the causal possi-
bilities. But assuming there is no way to skip the step, RR does conclusively recommend the
move to the half-hitcher. And it does so even if Kenny hasn’t yet registered this fact, and hence
isn’t among his motivating reasons.
To the extent, then, that it is plausible to call this fact a reason of the right kind, it seems
not to be merely a motivating or explanatory reason. It is a consideration carrying a recom-
mending weight that modulates the strength of the criticism the half-hitcher would face if he
5Note that we here assume that a choice or act can be appropriate relative to a standard of correctness even
if it doesn’t constitute conformity to the standard. We will also use the word “fitting” in this way, though we
realize that some use “fitting” as a synonym for “correct”. We assume that appropriateness can be naturally
enough analyzed in terms of reasons of the right kind relative to the standard, where these are understood as
considerations that bear on whether acting in the relevant way wouldmake a contribution toward conformity.
We do not similarly assume that the standard of correctness is analyzable in terms of reasons; indeed, we will
ultimately suggest that as long as standards of correctness are not inherently normative, it is permissible for a
reasons fundamentalist to explain the right-kind/wrong-kind reason distinction by appeal to them.
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pursued amore cumbersome strategy. And the criticismneedn’t be that he doesn’t conform to
the standard: he might eventually bumble into conformity. This fact suggests that the right-
kind/wrong-kind distinction at issue isn’t just a distinction between whether or not one is
doing what conforms to the standard. Each choice andmove can be assessed for a kind of ap-
propriateness or fittingness relative to the standard. This appropriateness is a function of how
well one is responding to considerations relevant to the attainment of the standard.
Observations of this kind make it plausible not just that there is an RKR/WKR distinc-
tion that everyone can and should acknowledge, but also that there is a task worthy of every-
one’s attention: the task of explaining why certain considerations are relevant to this distinc-
tive kind of criticism, while others are irrelevant despite having great, even conclusive, nor-
mative significance. Indeed, this task is compulsory for anyone interested in the grounds of
the criticism. Again, it is plausible that whether a move would be the most appropriate move
relative to the standard is determined by whether it is the move most strongly recommended
by these considerations, where some considerations can recommend with less than sufficient
force (e.g., this move would help a bit (though others are more helpful)).
Of course, this task doesn’t look daunting: the difference is clearly tied to the bearing of
the considerations on whether one would meet the standards that constitutively govern the
activity. Precisely this fact, onemight hope, saves reasons fundamentalists from their problem.
For, onemight hope, their problem can then be solved as a special case of this easier andmore
general problem.
Appreciating this point, Schroeder (2010) uses the generality of the problem as inspira-
tion for a particular account of what it is for something to be a right kind of reason. According
to this account, the right kindof reasons are always relativized toactivities. They are the reasons
that everyone engaged in the activity has in virtue of engaging in that activity. More officially:
Activity: What it is for r to be a right kind of reason to  relative to some activity a is
for r to be a reason for anyone engaged in a to  in virtue of being engaged in a.
Activity is poised to make plausible extensional predictions. It doesn’t seem like anyone ty-
ing knots has the reason provided by Billy—only Kenny does. But anyone tying Boy Scout
knots does have the reasons provided by the book. The nature of Boy Scout rope tying seems
to guarantee this. Similarly, not all the good butlers have the reason provided by Thomas—
only Mr. Carson does. But all butlers have the reasons provided by tradition. The nature of
butlering seems to guarantee this.
There are two basic thoughts behind Activity. First, wrong-kind reasons aren’t tied to
the nature of the activities in the right kind of way. Second, there is something too local about
wrong-kind reasons. Extensional predictions aside, we think that there is something very pow-
erful behind these thoughts. Thewrong kind of reasons don’t essentially bear on whether one
is helping to fulfill the aim of the activity, while the right kind of reasons do, and are consid-
erations that everyone engaged in the activity ought to consider on pain of meriting a kind
of criticism. Although we regard these thoughts as genuine insights, we will not assume that
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Activity in particular is true.6 Wemerely assume in what follows that some account that vin-
dicates these insights has to be right, and Activity is at least a good stab in the right direction.
Before proceeding further it is worth considering an objection to Activity in order to
highlight what we will be assuming. The objection is that Activity puts the cart before the
horse by insisting that what is fundamental are the activities; what is fundamental, according
to the objector, are the reasons themselves. We can then derive activity-types from the rea-
sons however we wish. For example, the objector might insist that what is fundamental to
epistemic normativity are reasons for certain reactions. The activity of believing will then just
be whatever activity purports to be sensitive to such reasons.
Reflection on standard buck-passing accounts of value encourages this objection. For
such accounts appear to proceed on the assumption that what is fundamental are the reasons
for various reactions. Once those reasons are picked out, we can then determine the activities
(if we are so inclined). Activity denies that this is the order of explanation. Instead, it holds
that the activities comebefore the (right-kind) reasons. Thenature of the activities themselves
determine the right-kind reasons.
While we recognize that this picture is natural—especially upon reflection on the basic
structure of buck-passing accounts of value—we think that it ultimatelymisses the key lessons
of theWKR problem. The fundamental lesson of theWKR problem is that somethingmust be
said in order to pick out the facts that are the reasons that serve in analyzing properties like
value. This lesson of course does not force us to Activity. But once this point is appreciated,
the virtues of Activity become apparent, for it does seem plausible that there is a correlation
between certain activities and the right-kind reasons. When you couple this factwith the need
to explain why right-kind reasons are right-kind, it starts to look appealing to think that the
nature of the activities are what explain why the right-kind reasons are right-kind.
That said, we are not endorsing Activity. We are only endorsing four commitments that
Activity helps to illustrate: first, that we need an explanation of whatmakes right-kind reasons
right-kind; second, that one can draw the right-kind/wrong-kind distinction wherever there
are standards of correctness; third, that theWKRs arewrong-kind in virtue of not being tied to
the standards in the right way; fourth, and finally, that the RKRs aren’t local and idiosyncratic:
rather, they are reasons shared by those who are tied to the standards in some relevant way.7
Since Activity illustrates the last three commitments so nicely, we will largely proceed as if it
is true. This is merely for the sake of concreteness and simplicity. Assuming a concrete view
6Wewill also not be assuming Schroeder’s account of what it takes for r to be a reason for anyone engaged
in a in virtue of being engaged in a. In fact, we think that Sharadin (2013, 2016) shows that Schroeder’s
view cannot work. We, like Sharadin, think that this sort of agent-neutrality should be explained in terms
of the constitutive standards of the activity. We suspect Schroeder doesn’t go for this because he is afraid
that this will be smuggling normative notions into his account of RKRs, which would in turn undermine his
fundamentalism. We think that this is a mistake because it is a mistake to think that constitutive standards are
genuinely normative. This will be spelled out in more detail below (see especially §4.2).
7We are fine with one reading our conclusion in this section conditionally. If one accepts these commit-
ments, then it is plausible that not all right-kind reasons are normative reasons. Establishing this conditional
would still be an important result given that prominent views accept the commitments.
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will make it easier to state the problems at the heart of the paper.
Given these commitments, however, wemust conclude that not all RKRs are normative
reasons. For standards of correctness per se are normative only in an anaemic sense. They set
up some standard, but not all are genuinely normative. Explaining the distinction between
anaemic and genuine normativity is a hard task, but there are clear examples on either side:
norms of etiquette and grammar, on the one hand, and epistemic norms, prudential norms,
and moral norms, on the other.8 All we assume here is that being a standard of correctness
isn’t sufficient for being genuinely normative. This claim is one that even fundamentalists who
thinknormativity comes fairly cheaply can embrace: for no fundamentalistswould think there
is necessarily a good reason to satisfy any standardwhatsoever (though somebelieve in a vaster
array of reasons than others). Yet it seems all standards generate a distinction between right-
kind and wrong-kind reasons. So, for the standards that aren’t genuinely normative, we get
RKRs that are not normative reasons.
To see this point vividly, consider cooking. There aremany standards of correctness that
purport to govern the cooking of cacio e pepe (a Roman pasta dish—literally, ‘cheese and pep-
per’).9 For there are loads of recipes for making this dish. Many of them conflict. For any
given standard corresponding to a recipe, there will be RKRs to do certain things—e.g., to
add extra cheese table-side. But—and here is the important point—not all of these RKRs are
normative reasons, even for those who are engaged in the cooking of cacio e pepe. As any self-
respecting Roman will tell you, many of these recipes lead to inferior cacio e pepe. The RKRs
associatedwith those standards plausibly have nomore genuinely normative significance than
other anaemic standards, such as the norms of etiquette and grammar.
It does not follow from this point that the right-kind/wrong-kind distinction that all
should acknowledge is not a distinction in reasons, as we will again emphasize in §2.4. There
is a criticism to which one is open in ignoring considerations relevant to satisfying the stan-
dards of correctness governing an activity. And these considerations have weights linked to
their bearing on how well one would be satisfying the standards that govern the activities, in
the attributive-value sense of “well”. They hence have the functional profile of reasons: they
are recommending considerations with weights whose balance determines a kind of criticism.
But the genuine normative significance of both the criticism and the considerations that help
to explain it is asmuch an open question as the normativity of criticisms of instrumental ratio-
nality and of the subjective reasons associated with requirements of instrumental rationality
(which we also assume are indeed reasons, though perhaps not always normative reasons if
Humeanism is false!).
Indeed, there is pressure for the reasons fundamentalist whowants to write off theWKR
problem as everybody’s problem to insist that this distinction is a distinction among reasons.
For themere fact that amore general wrong-kind/right-kind distinction can be drawn doesn’t
8Perhaps the most famous invocation of the difference between genuine normativity and anaemic nor-
mativity is Foot (1972). For further discussion, see Wodak (FC), Parfit (2011), Copp (2004), Woods (FC),
Baker (FC), Plunkett & Shapiro (2017), McPherson (2011).
9In EL’s opinion, the most delightful thing one can put in one’s mouth when it is prepared well.
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show that there is a problem that everyone faces parallel to the WKR problem. A genuine
analogue of the problemwould arise only if there were a kind of assessment which ought to be
understood as determined by the balance of considerations worth calling “reasons”. For only
if there is independent reason for everyone to analyze some form of assessment in terms of
reasons of the right kind would it be true that there is a WKR problem for everyone. It is not
enough that there be a distinction that everyone can understand. For there might be a special
obligation for certain theorists to explain this distinction owing to their need to invoke it in
their theory, and only this fact generates a problem.
The upshot is that the generality of the WKR problem shows that not all RKRs are nor-
mative reasons, for some standards of correctness are normatively anaemic. These standards
generate RKRs that are not plausibly normative reasons. So, in order to determine which con-
siderations are relevant for reasons-based analyses—in order to figure out what the normative
reasons are—one has to determine which RKRs are normative reasons, andwhy they are nor-
mative reasons. This is the Right-Kind of Reasons problem. It has the same form as the WKRs
problem, for that too is a problem concerned with differentiating some favorers from others.
It is widely assumed that once we sort the wrong-kind favorers from the right-kind favorers,
we will know which favorers to appeal to in reasons-based analyses. We’ve argued that this is
false; we also need to knowwhich right-kind favorers flow from robustly normative standards.
To provide this story is to provide a solution to the RKR problem.
2.2 How to Solve the Right-Kind of Reasons Problem
We agree that the WKR problem is everybody’s problem. For similar reasons, we think that
the RKR problem is everybody’s problem.10 In this subsection we will provide a schema for
solving it.
Recall how we got stuck with the WKR problem. We start trying to analyze complex
normative properties in terms of normative reasons. We then see that there are some facts
that seem to recommend reactions in the wrong way. This observation leads us to search for
an account of what it is for a fact to recommend a reaction in the right way. But as it turns out,
a fact can recommend in the right way and yet still not be a normative reason. So, solving the
WKRproblem isn’t sufficient for being in a position to pick out the normative reasons that are
supposed to be analyzing the complex stuff. This extra problem is the RKR problem.
To solve the RKR problem we need to carry out two extra steps. First, not only do we
need an account like Activity, we also need an account about which activities are normatively
relevant.11 That is, we need to knowwhich activities, if any, are such that the RKRs associated
with those activities are necessarily normative reasons. Once we have an account of this, will
10As wementioned above, we are happy to weaken this to the claim that the RKR problem is a problem for
everyone who accepts that the right view of RKRs has the four features we elucidate in §2.1.
11Again, we will speak of activities because we find it illuminating. One needn’t appeal to activities per
se. One could also appeal to standards of correctness or perhaps some other notion that plays the role that
activities play in Activity.
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we be in a position to determinewhich favorers can figure into reasons-based analyses. We call
the problem of determining which activities are robustly normative theNormativity Problem.
Solving this problem is the first step towards solving the RKR problem.
In order to solve the Normativity Problem, one must have a story about which activities
are normatively relevant. Now, we recognize that there are some obvious candidates: believ-
ing, intending, and desiring, for example, will plausibly be on the list. The hard part is not
coming up with a list of activities that are normatively relevant. So solving the Normativity
Problem doesn’t look that daunting. However, it is harder to give an account of what these
activities have in common that makes them normatively relevant. We call this the Rationale
Problem. Solving the Rationale Problem is the second step towards solving the RKR prob-
lem. With a solution to both the Normativity and the Rationale problems, one will have an
account of which activities are robustly normative and an explanation of why those are the
robustly normative activities.
So far problems have only multiplied. We started off with the WKR problem. Now we
have the RKR problem, which naturally breaks down into the Normativity Problem and the
Rationale Problem. As we’ve said, the WKR and RKR problem are structurally on all fours.
They are problems for everyone interested in using normative reasons to analyze normative
phenomena. Further, fundamentalists face both problems in full generality. In other words,
the success of the fundamentalist’s entire metanormative theory hinges on solving both prob-
lems. Without a solution to both problems, the fundamentalist lacks the resources to even
get going. This makes it all the more unfortunate that the fundamentalist has a particularly
hard time solving the RKR problem. We’ll see this shortly. First, though, we will elucidate
the RKR problem more by considering an analgous problem that only targets buck-passing
about value. This will naturally lead to an attempt to dismiss the problem out of hand. After
dismissing that dismissive response, we will explain why the fundamentalist has a particularly
hard time solving the RKR problem.
2.3 Analogous Problems for Buck-Passers about Value Simpliciter
To further understand the RKR problem, it is helpful to compare it to an analogous but more
local problem for a particular fundamentalist analysis—namely, the buck-passing account of
value simpliciter.12 In examining this more local problem, we will discover some points that
help to address a dismissive response to the RKR problem, which we rebut in the next subsec-
tion.
According to the simple buck-passing account of value simpliciter, what it is for X to be
valuable simpliciter is for there to be sufficient reasons to have some pro-attitude toward X.
This simple account, of course, faces the WKR problem. But as Schroeder points out, it is
12We don’t assume that reasons fundamentalists are committed to the existence of value simpliciter, or that
buck-passing accounts of value are exhausted by buck-passing accounts of value simpliciter. We focus on this
case to explain the kind of problem we are raising, which could also be raised for buck-passing accounts of
goodness-for (though perhaps not for accounts of attributive goodness, which isn’t clearly normative).
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plausible that everyone should accept a buck-passing account of certain evaluative properties,
like enviability and amusingness. He concludes that for this reason the buck-passer is off the
hook.
Although considering properties like admirability and enviability points to aWKR/RKR
distinction that everyone should want to explain, life is harder for buck-passers about value
simpliciter for this very reason. The problem cases that arise for these accounts point to a
notion of a right-kind reason and a corresponding notion of fittingness unsuited for under-
pinning a buck-passing account of value simpliciter. This suggests that the real problem for
buck-passers—that of explaining why certain reasons are relevant to the grounding of value
simpliciter and others aren’t—remains even after they produce an adequate account of the
WKR/RKR distinction. This is the localized version of the RKR problem.
To see this clearly, consider first the example of ‘amusing’. Close cousins to famous points
madeby JustinD’ArmsandDaniel Jacobsonbringout the challenge.13 Thekeypoint is that the
notion of a right-kind reason that makes the following analysis true is insensitive to goodness
and badness simpliciter:
Amusing: What it is for x to be amusing is for there to be right-kind reasons to be amused by
x.
The features of a joke or situation that make it amusing may well be features that make it bad
simpliciter. There is something funny about someone’s repeatedly making a prudentially bad
kind of mistake (this is the whole idea of slapstick comedy), and about absurd and incongru-
ous instantiations of badness (imagine a house being struck by lightning 100 times in a row).
Fans of dark humor will find the absurd badness of the world funny in itself. On a natural first
reading of the buck-passing account, this seems impossible. For the buck-passing account
holds that the features we have reason to have pro-attitudes like amusement towards are good
simpliciter (and in virtue of the fact that we have such reasons). This appears to ignore the role
that the internal standards of funniness play. In particular, it seems to ignore that those stan-
dards seem insensitive to goodness and badness simpliciter. Those standards only care about
humor, as it were. They embrace it wherever it is found, even in the bad.
One could try to deny that these things are amusing. But to do so would, as D’Arms and
Jacobson stress, involve pointing to features that are wrong-kind reasons relative to the stan-
dards that spell out what it takes for something to be funny. That is, to think that these things
are not funny simply because they are bad simpliciter is akin to thinking something is not funny
because it is morally bad. It is to point to wrong-kind reasons relative to the standards govern-
ing funniness. Our point, again, is that the standards governing funniness are not directly
sensitive to goodness and badness simpliciter. This is a cousin of D’Arms and Jacobson’s point
that the standards of funniness are not directly sensitive tomoral badness/impermissibility.14
13See D’Arms & Jacobson (2000a).
14It is worth spelling out the exact relationship our point has to D’Arms and Jacobson’s main point. Their
main point is that it is a conceptual mistake to think that the fact that something is morally bad/impermissible
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Importantly, this is not a local point about amusement. It is plausible that emotions
present their objects asmeeting or failing tomeet some standard of correctness, in some sense
of “present”. But it is easy to imagine emotions that present their objects as meeting standards
of correctness that fail to line up with anything good or bad simpliciter. More familiar emo-
tions provide further examples. Consider emotions like shock at x and their corresponding
correctness conditions (i.e., x’s being shocking). Or if you don’t like that example, consider
religious emotions like penitence, which is fitting only if one has sinned. There are conditions
under which these emotions are fitting, but from this nothing follows about whether anything
of normative significance is encoded by these feelings.
It is easy to imagine other possible emotions that would illustrate the same moral. We
might not havenames inordinary language for someof these emotions. Butwemayhaveother
signs—consider an emoticon with someone wearing sunglasses giving a thumbs-up, which
represents that to which it is responding as cool. One could imagine parallel emoticons for fly,
swag, rad, etc. Supposing that we could coin words for these emotions of the form emot, we
could imagine corresponding adjectives of the formemot-able. Right-kind reasons for emot-
ing X will be evidence that X is emot-able. But the emot-ability conditions will be given by
a standard of correctness that may not map onto anything of value or disvalue simpliciter.
What these reflections suggest is thatweneedadistinctionbetween right-kindandwrong-
kind considerations in favour of pro-attitudes and con-attitudes that flows from their built-in
standards, without regard towhether these standards track value simpliciter. But if so, then the
following revised version of the buck-passing account is false:
Right-KindBuck-Passing aboutValue Simpliciter: x is valuable (/disvaluable) simpliciter iff
there are sufficient right-kind reasons for having some pro-attitude (/con-attitude) toward x.
We can see that this cannot be right by thinking about cases like amusement, enviability, and
shock. Amusingness, enviability, and shockingness do correlate with right-kind reasons for
the attitudes of amusement, envy, and shock. But there is an open question about whether
these properties are values/disvalues simpliciter. If so, we should reject Schroeder’s case for
getting buck-passers about value simpliciter off the hook. Perhaps everyone should expect
there to be a solution to the WKR problem for ‘amusing’ and ‘shocking’. But it won’t give the
buck-passer everything she needs. It actually shows that she needs more than the general dis-
tinction between WKR/RKR for pro-attitudes. She also needs to tell us which pro-attitudes
are relevant to the analysis of value simpliciter.
is a reason not to be amused. We are making a parallel point against a reply the buck-passer might give to our
suggestion that features that are bad simpliciter cannot be funny. To give that response is to ignore the fact
that the standards that govern what is funny do not analytically rule out that features that are bad simpliciter
are funny in virtue of being bad simpliciter. We are also making a point that goes beyond D’Arms and Jacob-
son’s, namely that paying attention to the internal standards of amusement puts pressure on the buck-passer
to explain which pro-attitudes count. This is because our point about amusement shows that amusement is
not a pro-attitude that should ground goodness simpliciter. This illustrates the buck-passers analogue to the
Normativity Problem by showing that she has the task of telling us which pro-attitudes count.
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The buck-passer about value simpliciter now faces two problems. First, she must tell us
which pro-attitudes are such that right-kind reasons for them ground value simpliciter. This is
her analogue of the Normativity Problem. Second, the buck-passer must explain what these
attitudes have in common, such that the presence of sufficient RKRs for bearing them to x
entail that x valuable. This is the buck-passer’s analogue of the Rationale Problem.
Notice that the first problem differs from a superficially similar “problem” sometimes
mentioned for buck-passers. It has, of course, always been a question for buck-passers which
pro-attitudes are the ones to which they should at bottom appeal. Sometimes this question
is regarded as raising a problem. But there is not a problem—just an interesting question—
until it is shown that not all right-kind reasons for pro-attitudes are value-grounding in the
robust sense of ”value” that buck-passers were originally trying to analyze. But we can see
from reflecting on the generality of the WKR problem that not all right-kind reasons for pro-
attitudes are value-grounding in that sense. Hence, it is incumbent on buck-passers to solve
their analogues of the Normativity and Rationale Problems.15
2.4 Dismissing aDismissive Response
Reflection on the foregoing special case helps to address a dismissive response to our prob-
lems. One might have imagined some reasons fundamentalists, such as Parfit or Scanlon,
agreeing that there is a right-kind/wrong-kind distinction that arises relative to any arbitrary
standardof correctness, but insisting that this distinction is not necessarily a distinction among
reasons. The right-kind considerations that we are claiming are not normative reasons are,
these theorists might claim, not reasons at all. So, these theorists might insist that they don’t
have to say which attitudes or activities are relevant. Call this the dismissive response to the
RKR problem.
Before giving our main response to this reply, it is worth noting that this reply is not
available to all fundamentalists. Primitivist fundamentalists like Parfit and Scanlon can make
thismove, but fundamentalists like Schroeder who are alsoHumeans cannot. Schroeder does
think—unsurprisingly, given his Humeanism—that one can have reasons to fulfill the aim of
some activity simply in virtue of being engaged in that activity. If one is trying to tie a knot, one
presumably wants the knot to be tied and that desire just does, on a Humean view, generate
certain reasons. (Wewill return to this below.) WhileParfit andScanlonmightderide activity-
relative reasons, such derision would be theory-driven and, we think, not terribly convincing.
More importantly, the Dismissive Reply is implausible as a response to the localized
15One option, of course, is to insist that the pro- and con-attitudes that play the relevant theoretical roles
in the buck-passing account are primitive. This would side-step the local versions of the Normativity and
Rationale objections raised here. We have two things to say about this. First, this wouldn’t show that the
problems aren’t problems for the buck-passer. Indeed, to accept this form of primitivism is a way of accepting
that there is a problem. Second, primitivism is the option of last resort. We should investigate whether there
are viable explanations before we become primitivists. We think that there are views that offer explanations.
We explore some below.
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problem for the buck-passing account. Some reasons fundamentalists might antecedently
have been fine denying that right-kind considerations in an activity governed by some stan-
dard of correctness are right-kind reasons in that activity. But it is not plausible to deny that
the amusing properties of a joke are reasons to be amused by it. It makes good sense to be
amused by things that are amusing, whatever else might be said about one’s amusement. The
properties of a joke can also provide more or less of a case for being amused, and hence play a
contributory favouring role, as reasons do. We see no theory-neutral reason to deny the strong
intuition that if a joke is amusing, there are reasons to be amused by it. Since features that are
bad simpliciter aren’t necessarily right-kind reasons not to be amused (and some things may
be amusing because they are absurdly bad), the funny-making features will not be relevantly de-
feated by other right-kind reasons. So, the point remains there: sufficient right-kind reasons
for some pro-attitudes do not generate value simpliciter.
It is worth emphasizing that the point we are making here is a more local one that is
intended to clarify the structure of our main point. Although it is structurally parallel to our
main point, it is not the same point. Whatwe are arguing here is that the existence of sufficient
reasons of the right kind for having a pro-attitude toward x doesn’t imply that x is valuable sim-
pliciter. Even if one were to agree that the reasons in these cases are genuinely normative, our
conclusion here would remain. It is unclear that being amusing entails being good simpliciter
to any degree or in any way, or that being enviable entails being good simpliciter to any de-
gree or in any way. We don’t think it is plausible to claim that a deeply unequal world would
be good in a way because it would entail that some people are enviable, where this is a way
of being good. (For this reason, the analogue of our Normativity Problem presently under
discussion might be better be called the Value Problem.)
Accordingly, the problem here is to explain which right-kind reasons for pro-attitudes
are relevantly value-grounding, given that not all are. We think this problem is illuminat-
ingly analogous to the problemof explainingwhich right-kind reasons in general are relevantly
normativity-grounding. But the main difference between the problems simply reinforces the
strength of the original Normativity and Rationale Problems. For the assumptions needed to
get these problems going are much more minimal. For while there might be some shred of
plausibility in insisting that all evaluative properties correspond to ways of being good sim-
pliciter, there is no shred of plausibility in the thought that all standards of correctness cor-
respond to ways of being genuinely normative. Yet for someone engaged in an activity, con-
siderations that bear on whether acting in some way would contribute to satisfaction of the
activity’s constitutive standard of correctness have the same claim to being reasons as reasons
for envy and amusement. Insensitivity to both bears on the appropriateness of certain forms
of criticism, where the degree of appropriateness is modulated by how the relevant consider-
ations balance out.
The bottom line, then, is that one should not claim that right-kind considerations and
normative reasons are different kinds of things; indeed, as we noted earlier, one cannot make
this claim without abandoning the “everybody’s problem” response to the WKR problem. A
more plausible view is that normative reasons are a type of right-kind reason. But we need
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a way to draw the line, other than by gesturing at a special kind of normativity that seems to
smuggle in what they are trying to analyse.
3 The Fundamentalist’s Dilemma
So far our conclusions threaten everyone who wants to analyze normative notions in terms
of normative reasons; given how plausible reasons-based analyses are of certain notions, our
conclusions so far threaten just about everyone. Just as everyone has to differentiate between
favorers of the right-kind from favorers of the wrong-kind, everyone has to differentiate favor-
ers of the right-kind that are robustly normative from favorers of the wrong-kind that are only
anaemically normative. We promised, however, to raise deep worries for fundamentalism.
We’ll do that now.
We think the RKR problem raises a deep worry for fundamentalists. This is because
fundamentalism imposes tight constraints on how the problem can be solved, and these con-
straints make it quite unclear how fundamentalists can solve the RKR problem at all.
Here is what the fundamentalist must do in order to solve the RKR problem. First, the
fundamentalist must tell us which activities and attitudes are normatively relevant. Which
ones are such that right-kind reasons for them are robustly normative? Second, the funda-
mentalist must tell us what grounds the distinction between activities that are normatively
relevant and activities that are not—i.e., what these activities have in common in virtue of
which they are robustly normative. She should not rest content with a mere list.
These tasks are particularly hard for fundamentalists because it seems clear that the fun-
damentalist cannot appeal to anything genuinely normative to solve the problems. After all,
there are only two options for a fundamentalist who appeals to normative properties to solve
the problem: either she can appeal to something other than normative reasons or she can
appeal to normative reasons. To appeal to some non-reason normative property would call
fundamentalism into question. It would then be plausible that that property is at least as fun-
damental as reasons.
To appeal to normative reasonswon’t help, sincewhatwewant, precisely, is a story about
which right-kind reasons are genuinely normative reasons. To appeal to normative reasons
at this point would be to smuggle genuine normativity in through the back door, seemingly
independently of reasons. But part of the job description of right-kind reasons was to analyze
such normativity.
At this point things are looking pretty grim for the fundamentalist. It is unclear what
resources are available to the fundamentalist to solve theNormativity andRationale Problems
and thus to solve the RKR problem. Without normative stuff, what is left? The story would
have to be told in non-normative terms. But it is hard to see what that story could be.
Wecall this problem theFundamentalist’sDilemma. Theonlyoptions for solving theRKR
problemare to appeal to normative properties or natural properties; the former route seems to
be closed off by the constraints of fundamentalism, and it is simply hard to see what the latter
15 of 27
Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental
route would involve. Even if the RKR problem doesn’t strike one as pressing on its own, these
problems lead straightforwardly to the Fundamentalist’s Dilemma, which is pressing indeed.
4 Possible Solutions to the Fundamentalist’s Dilemma
Is the Fundamentalist’s Dilemma crippling? We hope not, since we are ourselves attracted to
fundamentalism. In this section, we will consider some possible responses to the dilemma
and indicate what we take to be the most promising solution.
Beforewe consider the options, it will be helpful to situate the options vis-a-vis reduction.
Unsurprisingly, wehave seen that fundamentalists cannot analyzenormativeRKRs in termsof
something else that is normative. To do this would be to give up on fundamentalism. Hence,
fundamentalism is incompatible with a certain type of reduction. This is a reduction of nor-
mative RKRs to something else that is normative. Despite this, fundamentalism is compatible
with another type of reduction. This a reduction of normative RKRs to something descriptive
or natural. So the fundamentalist has two options: either they think that normative RKRs can
be reduced to something descriptive or natural, or they think that they are irreducible. Wewill
call the latter view reasons primitivism.
As you might expect, there is more to say about reductive views than about primitivist
views. Primitivist views, in effect, hold that normative RKRs are ground-floor fundamental.
They are absolutely basic building blocks. There is not much one can do to positively develop
this view. As even its proponents acknowledge, it is to be defended negatively—it is vindi-
cated only by showing that all other views fail.16 That said, below we will suggest that in fact
something positive canbe said by the primitivist about theFundamentalist’sDilemma. Before
we get to that, we’ll discuss two reductive accounts.
4.1 Humeanism
TheHumean maintains that facts about normative RKRs reduce to facts about one’s desires.
Following Schroeder (2007), we can say that for the Humean, normative reasons for A to 
are facts that explain why -ing promotes at least one of A’s desires. If we combine this with
Activity, we can get an analysis of normative RKRs:
Humean Activity: What it is for r to be a normative RKR for A to  is for r to be a
reason shared by everyone engaged in a and for r to explain why -ing promotes some
of A’s desires.
Humean Activity is a conjunctive account of normative RKRs. Interestingly, given a prima
facie appealing assumption about being engaged in activities, the Humean can hold that in
fact Activity is the correct analysis of normative RKRs.
16See Parfit (2011), Scanlon (2014) and especially Korsgaard (1996).
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The assumption is this: necessarily, if you are engaged in an activity a, then you have at
least one desire that will be promoted if you dowhat everyone engaged in a has a reason to do
in virtue of being engaged in a. If this assumption is true and theHumean view is true, then it
turns out that all RKRs are normative reasons. That is, it turns out wewere wrong abovewhen
we insisted that some standards of correctness are normatively anaemic. For theHumean, any
standard of correctness can be normatively full-blooded for some agent A just in virtue of A
engaging in an activity governed by that standard.
By making this move, the Humean fundamentalist doesn’t solve the RKR problem, but
rather dissolves it. This is because the problemarises only given the claim that not all RKRs are
normative reasons. TheHumeanwhomakes good on the assumption thinks that all standards
of correctness generate normative RKRs for those agents engaged in the relevant activities. So
they have no burden explaining which activities generate normative RKRs, nor any burden
explaining why the activities that generate normative RKRs do so. They presumably meet the
latter burden just in virtue of vindicating Activity.
The ease with which the Humean view dissolves the problems is a serious virtue of the
view. This virtue, as far aswe know, has never been articulated (althoughwe suspect Schroeder
is well aware of it). However, this virtue should carry the day only if we should accept both the
Humean view of reasons and the assumption about engaging in activities (which we will call
the Engagement Assumption). Unfortunately, both are seriously questionable. Furthermore,
we think that the triad of views consisting of the Humean view, the Engagement Assumption,
and Activity is implausible despite its ability to dissolve the problem. We will defend each of
these claims in turn.
Let’s start with the Engagement Assumption. While the Engagement Assumption does
have initial plausibility, we think that it doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. It seems initially plausi-
ble because many activities are essentially intentional. For those activities, it is plausible that
someone engaged in that activity will necessarily have a desire promoted by conforming to
the standards of the activity. That desire will be the desire associated with one’s intention to
engage in the activity.
The problem is that not all activities relevant to RKRs are essentially intentional.17 Con-
sider believing. One can engage in the activity of believing without intending to so engage.
At some point in our development we come to have the capacity to believe, and at that point
we just start believing. An intention to have beliefs is not necessary. Thus, it seems that be-
lieving is not an essentially intentional activity and so is far from obvious that everyone has a
desire that would be promoted by conforming to the constitutive standards of belief in virtue
of engaging in it. So the Engagement Assumption doesn’t look airtight. In fact, it looks like it
undergeneralizes.
Furthermore, it is intuitively plausible that some standards are not genuinely normative.
17Schroeder concedes this point. He tries to get out of the problem by arguing that for each non-essentially
intentional activity, there will be some essentially intentional activity that correlates with it (e.g., with admi-
ration he suggests emulation). Sharadin (2013, 2016) shows that this strategy will not work.
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Of course, it is no secret that Humeanism has revisionary implications. And much has been
said on both sides of the debate. We don’t expect to settle the debate here. Nevertheless, the
point can be put in a special way here. Consider certain ritualistic killings. Given that they
are ritualistic, there are standards of correctness governing them. It is possible to perform
the killings in a way that deviates from these standards. So aWKR problem can arise for these
ritualistic killings. Are the RKRs relative to those standards normative RKRs for those (inten-
tionally) engaged in those activities? Plausibly not. This would make engagement in horrid
activities bizarrely self-vindicating.
We know that there are possible ways out for the Humean. In fact, we recognize that
we have added ammunition to their arsenal by showing that they have a powerful reply to the
Fundamentalist’s Dilemma. Nonetheless, the triad of views is not all that plausible. This is for
two reasons. Firstly, it doesn’t look like the Engagement Assumption that is needed to get the
reply to work is going to get the right predictions out of Activity. That is, it doesn’t look like
the kinds of activities relevant to Activity are essentially intentional activities. But that is what
is needed in order for the Humean view to show that all RKRs are normative reasons, which
is what the Humean needs in order to dissolve the Fundamentalist’s Dilemma. The second
problem is a deeper problem with Humeanism: it generates too many reasons and generates
them too easily.
4.2 Constitutivism
A second reductive response is a version of constitutivism. It attempts to solve the Normativ-
ity and Rationale Problems in one fell swoop by telling us that the activities for which right-
kind reasons are normative reasons are the activities in which any agent must be engaged in
qua agent. It defuses the Fundamentalist’s Dilemma by noting that the line it draws to dis-
tinguish between right-kind reasons that are normative and right-kind reasons that are not is
a descriptive line. In this way, constitutivism provides an elegant reductive solution to the
fundamentalist’s problems.
Let’s walk through the solution at a slower pace. Let’s start with the Normativity Prob-
lem. The constitutivist might start by pointing out that not all activities are created equal. In
particular, some activities seem essential to our agency. We can call these activities the activi-
ties essential to deliberation. Whenwedeliberate practically, we deliberate aboutwhat towant,
what to intend, and what to do. When we deliberate theoretically, we deliberate about what
to believe and how confident we should be about various claims. To engage in deliberation is
just what it is to be an agent. This is a natural or descriptive claim about what agency is.
The constitutivist holds that we can reduce facts about normative RKRs to facts about
agency. In particular, we can analyze normative RKRs in terms of the activities that are con-
stitutive of agency:
Constitutive Activity: What it is for r to be a normative RKR to  relative to some
activity a is for r to be a reason shared by everyone engaged in a in virtue of being
engaged in a and for a to be an activity constitutive of agency.
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This is a constitutivist view twice over because it understands RKRs in terms of the constitu-
tive norms of activities and it understands normative RKRs in terms of what’s constitutive of
agency. We will call the former view constitutivism about RKRs and the latter position consti-
tutivism about normative RKRs.18
This is an interesting analysis. It is also predictive once it is supplemented with views
about the activities constitutive of agency. And there are already prominent views in the lit-
erature about particular activities, with believing being the most well-developed.19 The plau-
sibility of these views provides indirect evidence for Constitutive Activity. Consider belief
again. Believing is plausibly on the list of normatively relevant activities. It is plausible that
right-kind reasons for belief are normative reasons. The standard of correctness for belief is,
onemight think, surely not on all fours with norms of etiquette or some specific set of instruc-
tions for cooking cacio e pepe. But what could distinguish the standard of correctness for belief
from these other standards other than the fact that “playing the belief game” is a constitutive
feature of agency? If the constitutivist story provides a credible answer—perhaps the only
obvious answer—to this question about the normativity of belief ’s standard of correctness,
explanatory parsimony recommends telling the same story elsewhere.
This version of constitutivism has an obvious solution to offer to the Rationale Prob-
lem. What unifies the activities on the list is the fact that they are all constitutive of agency.
Onemight find appeals to agency normatively irrelevant, but all should agree that this type of
appeal to what’s constitutive of agency is interestingly unified.
There are, of course, challenges for constitutivists. Our goal isn’t to provide a compre-
hensive defense of constitutivism here, but we will consider two challenges. The first is the
most notable general challenge to constitutivism and is often thought to plague all versions of
the view. This is the ”schmagency” challenge.20 This challenge, though, does not obviously
apply to the type of constitutivist view appealed to here. This is because the force of the chal-
lenge is felt onlywhen certain background assumptions aremade about authority. These back-
ground assumptions aremade by some constitutivists. Themost notable example is Christine
Korsgaard.21 Korsgaard is interested in employing constitutivism in a particular context. The
operative question in this context is a question about the normative authority of morality—
whybemoral? GivenKorsgaard’s unorthodoxviews about the functionofmoral concepts, she
has a very demanding view about what it takes to vindicate the normative authority of moral-
ity.22 Any satisfactory answer, for Korsgaard, will strike any agent inquiring about what to do
as a satisfactory answer. This standard demands from a successful answer that it convinces a
skeptic—a tall order indeed.
18We we were implicitly relying on constitutivism about RKRs when we laid out Activity above. We are
making it explicit here mostly because it will be helpful in the next subsection.
19See, e.g., Velleman (2000a), Shah (2003), Sosa (2015), Wedgwood (2017). For discussion of intention,
see Shah (2008).
20Originally articulated in Enoch (2006). See also Enoch (2011).
21See especially Korsgaard (1996).
22See (Korsgaard, 1996, ch. 1) for the (complicated) details.
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These background views open Korsgaard up to a particularly damning version of the
schmagency problem. For it seems entirely intelligible to skeptically challenge the norma-
tive relevance of what’s constitutive of agency. The normative relevance of agency is an open
question like (nearly) anything else. One can intelligibly ask why one shouldn’t opt out of
agency in order to become a schmagent. What this shows is that Korsgaard’s demands for a
successful answer cannot be met. She has a schmagency problem.
But not all constitutivist views have the ambitions of Korsgaard’s view. We are assuming
that the proponent of Constitutive Activity is not in the business of convincing the skeptic
via Constitutive Activity. Moreover, we recommend to the proponent of Constitutive Activ-
ity that she not go in for answering whether there is some special reason for being an agent
rather than a schmagent. That question has a false presupposition—viz. that constitutivism
is committed to thinking that there is such a reason.
Sometimes we have no reasons to be agents any longer. Sometimes we should kill our-
selves. Other times we might not have particularly compelling reasons to be an agent, but,
nevertheless, we are agents. We thus have all sorts of normative reasons, per Constitutive Ac-
tivity. The fact that, in these cases, agents don’t have particular strong reasons to be agents is
neither here nor there. Without appealing to claims about authority, it is hard to generate pres-
sure to think otherwise. The constitutivist should deny those overly ambitious claims about
authority.23
This challenge also strikes us as weak in the context of the Fundamentalist’s Dilemma.
Reasons fundamentalism had a lot going for it. It offers a beautiful account of the internal
structure of the normative. Constitutivism provides the obvious resolution of the Fundamen-
talist’s Dilemma. It is plausible on first-order grounds that the list of activities suggested by
constitutivism is the list of activities for which right-kind reasons are normative reasons. But
if one is already attracted to reasons fundamentalism, there seems to be no deep explanation
of why that list is the right list other than the explanation given by the constitutivist. If reasons
fundamentalism is true, the Fundamentalist’sDilemmamust have an answer. Perhaps the best
argument for constitutivism is that it provides this answer.
The second challenge we will consider is a more local worry for Constitutive Activity.
The core of the worry is that Constitutive Activity undergenerates because not enough activ-
ities are constitutive of agency to generate enough normative RKRs. We can see the worry
by thinking about particular attitudes. Admiration seems to be the sort of attitude we have
normative RKRs to have. According to Constitutive Activity, this is true only if the activity
that governs admiration is an activity that is constitutive of agency. But this is far from clear. It
seems plausible that we would be the same sort of creature even if we didn’t have the capacity
for admiration.
We think that this is a serious challenge to Constitutive Activity. Further, the point is
obviously not limited to admiration. There are likely many other reactions that intuitively
are reactions we have normative RKRs to have even though it is not obvious that the activi-
23For a similar response, see Smith (2015).
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ties associated with those reactions are constitutive to agency. We’ll call these Normative But
Optional activities. We can’t hope to meet these challenges here, but we will sketch out two
strategies for meeting them.
Thefirst strategy is simple. It insists that someparticularNormativeButOptional activity
is in fact constitutive of the sort of agents we are. Wewill call this theDoublingDown strategy.
In order to apply the Doubling Down strategy in all cases, it seems to us that one would need
to adopt a fragile conception of what constitutes the sort of agency normal agents exemplify.
On such a fragile understanding, it is easy to cease being the sorts of agents normal agents are.
In fact, it might be that some actual human beings fail to be the kind of agents that normal
agents are (e.g., perhaps psychopaths fail to be the sort of agents normal adults are). Such a
fragile view will have some implications that some will find unappealing, but they don’t strike
as wildly implausible on their face.24
Furthermore, one needn’t accept the fragile view of agency in order to use the Doubling
Down strategy in a more local way. For example, we are actually skeptical that admiration is
a Normative But Optional activity even if one accepts a robust account of the constitution
of our agency. This is because we find it plausible that admiration is a central reaction to our
moral agency, which is a constitutive part of our agency even if you have a robust view.25
The second strategy insists that the purported Normative But Optional activities are re-
ducible to reactions that are obviously constitutive of our agency, with the obvious contenders
being belief and desire. We call this the Reduction Strategy. In order to apply the Reduction
Strategy in full generality, one would likely commit oneself to a sparse philosophical psychol-
ogy. We note, though, that the exact sort of project that seems needed is already rigorously de-
fended by several prominent philosophical psychologists—e.g., Arpaly & Schroeder (2014),
Sinhababu (2017).
Of course, just like it was with the Doubling Down strategy, one might apply the Re-
ductive Strategy more locally. When it comes to admiration, for example, one might argue
that admiration reduces to a bundle of beliefs and desires. To take an oversimplistic view, one
might hold that admiration is the bundle of a belief that the object of admiration is desirable
and the desire to emulate the admired (for discussion, see Zagzebski (2015)). If such a reduc-
tion were true (or a suitably more complex version), then it would be plausible that RKRs for
admiration are normative RKRs. For, if the reduction were true, then RKRs for admiration
would just be RKRs for having certain beliefs and desires. Believing and desiring are clearly
constitutive of agency and thus RKRs for believing and desiring are normative, per Constitu-
tive Activity.26
24Some evidence for this is that Korsgaard adopts a very fragile view of one’s practical idendity in recent
work (see especially Korsgaard (2009)).
25See Zagzebski (2015) and Irwin (2015).
26Interestingly, this doesn’t quite show that admiration is constitutive of agency. For even if the reduction
is true, it seems possible to be the type of agents we are without having admiration—i.e., without having the
bundles of beliefs and desires that constitute admiration. Even if it doesn’t show that admiration is constitutive
of agency, it does show that theRKRs for admiration are normative RKRs for those that do admire. Thismight
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These are the strategieswe think defenders ofConstitutiveActivity should use to combat
cases of purported Normative But Optional activities. While we are skeptical that either can
be used in full generality, we are hopeful that local uses of each strategy can stave off the most
pressing worries. What we’ve hoped to show here is that with more work these objections
can be overcome and thus that we should continue to think of Constitutive Activity as a live
option.
While this argument on its own might not sell constitutivism, it in combination with
reasons fundamentalism and the need for an answer to the Fundamentalist’s Dilemma strike
us as providing a serious argument for constitutivism. At the very least, the disjunction either
constitutivism is true or reasons fundamentalism is falsemerits high credence.
4.3 A LouderQuietism
We will end by discussing a non-reductive view. We end with this view not because we think
it is themost plausible—far from it—but rather because our discussion of the reductive views
will help us see how a quietist position can be a bit more informative than some quietist
views.27 Just tobe clear, however: this quietist view is a quietist view. That is, it holds that there
is nothing informative that can be said at the analytic level about why the normative RKRs are
normative RKRs. They cannot be analyzed in terms of something normative—hence fun-
damentalism. They cannot be analyzed in terms of something natural or descriptive—hence
primitivism. This much is just run-of-the-mill quietism.
Nevertheless, according to the louder quietismwe have inmind, the RKR problem does
have a solution of a certain kind. There is a compact list to be given of the attitudes for which
right-kind reasons are normative reasons, and there is a principled story to be told about what
the members of this list have in common. But according to our quietist, the principled story
to be given is at bottom a piece of first-order normative theorizing, one that is supported by sys-
tematizing our intuitions aboutwhat is a reason for what. It doesn’t tell us anything about how
the normative is grounded in the natural or descriptive, pace the constitutivst and Humean.
To make this view more concrete, we will sketch one way that it could be developed,
though it is only one that we mention for the sake of illustration. This version of the view
gives the same list of normatively relevant activities that the constitutivist view gives in solving
the Normativity Problem, and even agrees with the constitutivist about what the elements of
that list have in common. But it provides a first-order rationale for the latter claim. The most
seem to threaten the letter of Constitutive Agency. We don’t think that it does. The right way to think of it is
that if the reduction is true, then the activities that are relevant are believing and desiring. So if admiration isn’t
constitutive but the reduction is true, admiring is just not the activity that we plug into the analysis in order to
determine what the normative RKRs are for admiring. We need to plug in believing and desiring. Thanks to
an anonymous referee for prompting us to say more here.
27We have in mind Parfit and Scanlon in particular. We recognize that some quietists might be immune
to everything we say below. We also recognize that Parfit and Scanlon have engaged in the sort of first order
project we discuss when it comes to parts of the normative domain, withmorality being the domain they have
focused themost on. The viewwe sketch here is supposed to play a similar role but atmuchmore general level.
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natural way for quietists to do all of these things is by becoming constitutivists about RKRs.
That is, by thinking that the reasons that are shared by everyone engaged in an activity in virtue
of being engaged in that activity are the reasons that have some connection to the constitutive
standards of that activity. Normative reasons are then taken to be RKRs generated for the
activities constitutive of agency, where this ismade as a first-order claim. It is a first-order view
with some plausibility, as the literature on how to derive a truth-norm on belief by appeal to
constitutive norms illustrates.28
To see the main point more clearly, think about the Moorean view about goodness and
pleasure. The Moorean view about goodness is a primitivist and non-naturalist one. It holds
that goodness is an unanalyzable property that is different in kind from the natural properties.
Nevertheless, the Moorean thinks that the only states of the world that had this property are
pleasure states. This doesn’t mean that the property of being good is the same as the property
of beingpleasant. Rather, it’s just to say that the good is pleasure. So a certain kindof first-order
hedonism is, of course, compatible with primitivist non-naturalism.
The non-naturalist constitutivist view we’ve imagined is like theMoorean version of he-
donism. It holds that the right-kind reasons (the reason analogue of the good) are the facts
that are tied to constitutive standards in a certain way. This doesn’t mean that the property
of being a normative reason is the same as the property of being a fact that stands in the right
relation to constitutive standards. All that is posited is a necessary correlation.29
Thisversionof quietism ismore interesting than run-of-the-mill quietismbecause it gives
a unifying view about which facts are normative RKRs. It doesn’t give us a metaphysical ex-
planation of why they are like this. Nor does it tell us that the kind of things RKRs are is the
same as the kind of things tables, chairs, and electrons are. Nevertheless, it tells a unifying
story about which facts are the normative RKRs.
While this view has a bit more predictive power than run-of-the-mill quietism, it is still
anchored in a strange bit ofmetaphysics. It posits a brute necessary correlation betweenRKRs
and constitutive standards.30 Furthermore, this an essential feature of the view. This is what
28See, e.g., Shah (2003), Velleman (2000b).
29The existence of Moorean hedonism doesn’t show that there aren’t intelligible metaphysical questions to
ask about what the good is. Of course, Mooreans deny that these questions have substantive answers. But
it would be a bad move to claim that there are no intellgibile metaphysical questions to ask about the nature
of goodness simply because one can hold that the independent property of goodness necessarily correlates
with pleasure. Analogously, it would be a bad move to hold that we cannot intelligibly ask the metaphysical
question of what RKRs are normative RKRs just because one could hold that the independent property of
being a normativeRKRnecessarily correlateswith the property of being a consideration that is a reason shared
by all engaged in an activity consitutive of agency.
30Onemight wonder if this only looks odd because we have been assuming that the solution to theNorma-
tivity Problem maintains that all the RKRs for the robustly normative activities are normative RKRs. If one
were to deny this, would there be a brute necessary connection? Well, it is right that the brute connection
we are complaining about here is a brute connection between normative RKRs and the considerations that
provide evidence that the standards of correctness of certain activities constitutive of agency aremet. But even
quietists who deny that all the RKRs of constitutive activities provide normative RKRs posit a brute connec-
tion. Any quietist who holds that there is a correlation between some descriptive facts and some normative
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makes it a quietist view. This makes it stark that the ‘solution’ it offers to the problems isn’t
much of a solution. The best the quietist can do is change the subject from the second-order
question about the metaphysics of normative RKRs to the first-order question about what
reasons there are. They remain silent about the second-order question except to say that it is
not a question worth trying to answer.
4.4 Sizing Up theOptions
We’ve explored three replies to the Fundamentalist’s Dilemma. The first two were reductive.
They attempt to analyze normative RKRs in terms of something natural. This is compatible
with fundamentalism because fundamentalism is merely the claim that normative RKRs are
normatively fundamental. The last view was a quietist non-naturalist view. It held that norma-
tive RKRs are not analyzed at all. They are basic building blocks. Nevertheless, we saw that
the quietist could borrow some machinery from the reductive constitutivist account in order
to be have a bit more predictive power.
We think the best option is the reductive constitutivist one. Constitutivism about RKRs
is, we think, themost natural way of developingActivity. Moreover, it is striking howplausible
it is that the the activities that are constitutive of agency are the activities that would naturally
go on one’s list of activities that are normative in a full-blooded sense. This is obviously far
from decisive, but we are intrigued by it.
Furthermore, the constitutivist viewhas serious virtues compared to theother twoviews.
It has a principled way of avoiding the explosion of normative RKRs that the Humean is sad-
dledwith. The constitutivist view lets us hold onto the plausible thought that not all standards
are created normatively equal. Some of them are normatively irrelevant for everyone. The
Humean, by contrast, holds that any standard can become normatively relevant for an agent
just in virtue of that agent engaging in an activity governed by those standards. That makes
full-blooded normativity too cheap.
The constitutivist view has a serious explanatory advantage over the quietist view. The
quietist view posits a brute metaphysical necessity between normative RKRs and the consti-
tutive standards of the activities that are constitutive of agency. Brutemetaphysical necessities
are born of desperation. We should avoid desperation if we can. The reductive constitutivist
view allows us to avoid desperation because it offers an explanation of themetaphysical neces-
sity. There is a necessary correlation between normative RKRs and the constitutive standards
of the activities constitutive of agency becausewhat it is to be a normative RKR is to be a RKR
relative to an activity that is constitutive of agency.
These are serious virtues of the constitutivist view. They are obviously not fully decisive.
We haven’t surveyed all the possible solutions to the Fundamentalist’s Dilemma. Nor have we
facts posits a brute connection. So you can’t get out of a brute connection by giving up our assumption. By
giving it up, you will certainly have a less elegant theory, though. Pending a surprising explanation of why
some RKRs associated with consititutive activities are not normative, this view seems to lose the elegance of
the view we consider in the text. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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seriously considered the option of abandoning fundamentalism because of the dilemma. Our
interest has been in clearly articulating the dilemma and seeing if there are good routes out
of the problem. The constitutivist route is the best option we’ve thought of. Whether this a
failure of our imaginations is yet to be determined.
5 ConcludingMorals
Let’s take stock of the key morals. The first key moral is that the generality of theWKR/RKR
distinction shows that there is another problem that is structurally similar to the WKR Prob-
lem. This is the RKR Problem. The generality of the WKR/RKR distinction gives rise to the
RKRproblembecause the generality of theproblemshows that not allRKRsarenormative rea-
sons. Accordingly, those of us who analyse complex normative notions in terms of normative
reasons—i.e., everyone—cannot pick out our analysans just by providing a principled distinc-
tion betweenWKRs and RKRs. We also need a story about which activities/attitudes are the
ones for which RKRs are normative reasons. But this task is highly non-trivial. Further, this
task is especially difficult for the fundamentalist. We demonstrated this via the Fundamental-
ist’sDilemma. Fundamentalismblocks one fromappealing to anything normative to solve the
RKR problem. This forces the fundamentalist to pick between quietism and reductionism.
The moral of the story is that to properly solve the RKR problem, the fundamentalist is
forced into taking a stand about the metaphysical nature of normative reasons. That is, she
has to take a stand about whether naturalism or non-naturalism is true. In some ways this is
unsurprising once you go in for the thought that something needs to be said about what the
basic building blocks are like. And theWKR problem clearly forces the fundamentalist to say
something about this. Relying on the ‘counts in favor’ idiom doesn’t cut it. But it’s obvious
that the fundamentalist cannot appeal to anything normative to explainwhich facts that count
in favor are her building blocks. So if she is going to say anything with explanatory power, she
will need to appeal to something natural.
The surprising twist is that she will have to domore than solve theWKR problem. She’ll
also have to solve the RKR problem. As we saw, this problem breaks down into the problem
of telling us which activities/attitudes are the ones for which RKRs are normative reasons,
and the problem of telling us why. It is here, we suggested, where the fundamentalist will
take a stand over naturalism. We have suggested that the stand she should take is in favor of a
form of reductive constitutivism. This view offers the best balance of explanatory power and
extensional adequacy. And those are the right kind of reasons for accepting a theory.
References
Arpaly, N. & Schroeder, T. (2014). In Praise of Desire. Oxford University Press.
Baker, D. C. (FC). Skepticism about ought simpliciter. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 13.
25 of 27
Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental
Copp, D. (2004). Moral naturalism and three grades of normativity. InNormativity and Nat-
uralism. Ontos-Verlag.
Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics without Principles. Oxford University Press.
D’Arms, J. & Jacobson, D. (2000a). The moralistic fallacy: On the ”appropriateness” of emo-
tions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61(1), 65–90.
D’Arms, J. & Jacobson, D. (2000b). Sentiment and value. Ethics, 110(4), 722–748.
Enoch, D. (2006). Agency, shmagency: Why normativity won’t come from what is constitu-
tive of agency. The Philosophical Review, 115(2), 169–198.
Enoch,D. (2011). Shmagency revisited. InM.Brady (Ed.),NewWaves inMetaethics. Palgrave-
Macmillan.
Foot, P. (1972). Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. The Philosophical Review,
81(3), 305–316.
Irwin, T. H. (2015). Nil Admirari? uses and abuses of admiration. Aristotelian Society Supple-
mentary Volume, 89(1), 223–248.
Korsgaard, C. (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Harvard University Press.
Korsgaard, C. M. (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford University
Press.
McPherson, T. (2011). Against quietist normative realism. Philosophical Studies, 154(2),
223–240.
Parfit, D. (2011). OnWhat Matters. Oxford University Press.
Plunkett, D. & Shapiro, S. (2017). Law, morality, and everything else: General jurisprudence
as a branch of metanormative inquiry. Ethics, 128(1), 37–68.
Rabinowicz,W.&Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2004). The strike of the demon: On fitting proat-
titudes and value. Ethics, 114(3), 391–423.
Scanlon, T. (2014). Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford University Press.
Schroeder, M. (2007). Slaves of the Passions. Oxford University Press.
Schroeder,M. (2010). Value and theRightKindofReason. InR. Shafer-Landau (Ed.),Oxford
Studies in Metaethics, volume 5. Oxford University Press.
Shah, N. (2003). How truth governs belief. Philosophical Review, 112(4), 447–482.
26 of 27
Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental
Shah, N. (2008). How action governs intention. Philosophers’ Imprint, 8(5), 1–19.
Sharadin, N. (2013). Schroeder on the wrong kind of reasons problem for attitudes. Journal
of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 7, 1–8.
Sharadin, N. (2016). Reasons wrong and right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(3), 371–
399.
Sinhababu, N. (2017). Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling.
Oxford University Press.
Skorupski, J. (2011). TheDomain of Reasons. Oxford University Press.
Smith, M. (2015). Themagic of constitutivism. American Philosophical Quarterly.
Sosa, E. (2015). Judgment and Agency. Oxford University Press.
Velleman, D. (2000a). On the aim of belief. In D. Velleman (Ed.),The Possibility of Practical
Reason. Oxford University Press.
Velleman, D. (2000b). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
Wedgwood, R. (2017). The Value of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
Wodak, D. (FC). Fictional normativity and normative authority. Canadian Journal of Philos-
ophy. Manuscript, Virginia Tech University.
Woods, J. (FC). The authority of formality. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 13.
Zagzebski, L. (2015). I—admiration and the admirable. Aristotelian Society Supplementary
Volume, 89(1), 205–221.
27 of 27
